---
url: 'https://docs.jpool.one/additional-information/security-and-transparency.md'
description: >-
  JPool's security practices, smart contract audits, multisig governance, and
  operational transparency for Solana liquid staking.
---

# Security and Transparency

JPool is built on the principle that users should never have to trust a single operator with their funds. This page covers the audits, architecture, and operational practices that protect your stake.

## Smart contract audits

JPool runs on the [Solana Stake Pool Program](https://www.solana-program.com/docs/stake-pool), an open-source, immutable on-chain program maintained by Solana Labs. The program has undergone **9 independent security audits** by leading firms:

| Auditor | Report |
|---|---|
| [Kudelski](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/KudelskiStakePoolAudit-2021-07-07.pdf) | Jul 2021 |
| [Neodyme](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/NeodymeStakePoolAudit-2021-10-16.pdf) | Oct 2021 |
| [Quantstamp](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/QuantstampStakePoolAudit-2021-10-22.pdf) | Oct 2021 |
| [Neodyme (2nd)](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/NeodymeStakePoolAudit-2022-12-10.pdf) | Dec 2022 |
| [OtterSec](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/OtterSecStakePoolAudit-2023-01-20.pdf) | Jan 2023 |
| [Halborn](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/HalbornStakePoolAudit-2023-01-25.pdf) | Jan 2023 |
| [Neodyme (3rd)](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/NeodymeStakePoolAudit-2023-01-31.pdf) | Jan 2023 |
| [Neodyme (4th)](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/NeodymeStakePoolAudit-2023-11-14.pdf) | Nov 2023 |
| [Halborn (2nd)](https://github.com/anza-xyz/security-audits/blob/master/spl/HalbornStakePoolAudit-2023-12-31.pdf) | Dec 2023 |

::: tip
All audit reports are published in the [Stake Pool Program documentation](https://www.solana-program.com/docs/stake-pool#security-audits). The full source code is open for anyone to review.
:::

## Non-custodial architecture

JPool never has access to user funds. All staking, unstaking, and rebalancing operations are executed by the on-chain program with no intermediary.

* **No custody risk.** SOL deposited into JPool is managed entirely by the Stake Pool Program. No private key held by JPool operators can move user funds.
* **Frontend-independent.** Users can interact with the pool directly via the [CLI](../tech-docs/cli-reference.md) even if the JPool website is unavailable.
* **Redeemable on-chain.** JSOL can be burned for SOL via the on-chain program: delayed unstake settles at epoch boundaries, instant unstake depends on reserve liquidity. Withdrawals are executed by the program, not by JPool.

## Multisig governance

Pool admin keys (manager and staker) are protected by a [Squads](https://squads.so/) multisig wallet with a **2-of-3 signing threshold**. This means:

* No single operator can change pool parameters, add or remove validators, or update fees.
* Every administrative action requires approval from at least two key holders.
* Pool authority keys are stored on offline hardware wallets for additional protection.

## Infrastructure security

JPool's web infrastructure follows industry best practices:

* **Encryption in transit.** All connections use TLS 1.3.
* **DDoS and WAF protection.** Cloudflare shields the frontend and API endpoints.
* **Access controls.** SSH access requires hardware security keys. All admin accounts use multi-factor authentication. Access follows the principle of least privilege.
* **Secrets management.** API keys and credentials are stored in a managed vault, never in source code.
* **Monitoring.** Prometheus and Grafana provide real-time alerting on system health and on-chain pool metrics.

## Incident response

JPool maintains an incident response plan to handle security events quickly:

* **Deposit pause.** Deposits can be paused as a precaution. A deposit pause does not affect the on-chain withdrawal path.
* **On-call rotation.** The operations team runs 24/7 alerting with defined escalation paths.
* **Validator action.** Underperforming or malicious validators can be removed and stake rebalanced within one epoch.
* **Public disclosure.** Severity-1 incidents are disclosed publicly after mitigation.
* **Security contact.** Report vulnerabilities or concerns to <admin@jpool.one>.